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NATIONAL POLICY ON INCOMES. EMPLOYMENT, PRICES AND PROFITS - 
The Economics of Increasing Inequality.
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Samuel Victor Chinvoka*
In attempting to follow optimal strategies of development, countries often 
make crucial decisions on issues affecting the allocation of resources 
between present and future wants, or between private and public wants. These 
decisions might adversely affect the distribution of income among the different 
income groups, which would inevitably lead to conflicts among them.
To avoid such conflicts, governments could try to incorporate some form of 
income redistribution in their policies. This, ostensibly, w ill be to put 
the whole economy into tune as i t  were, i.e. to prevent some government 
policies being frustrated by uncontrolled "market" forces which could distribute 
inc»me in an undesirable manner. The conflicts might not be completely avoided 
all the same, because people in Government belong to some class in the society, 
hence their decisions could be biased towards their own class interests. The 
government of the Republic of Botswana is  an example in th is attempt to 
equitably d istribute income.
This paper discusses one policy of government aimed at income distribution, 
the "national Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and P ro fits" (hereafter the 
Incomes Policy). The Incomes P o licy 's  aims are discussed and evaluated. 
Conclusions reached could be a pointer to the results we should expect from 
continued implementation of the Incomes Policy.
Reasons behind the Establishment of the Incomes Policy
The Botswana Government published the second of it s  ro llin g  plans in 1970.
This plan aimed at:
a) securing the fastest possible rate of economic 
growth to raise liv in g  standards;
b) achieving financial independence;
c ) securing rapid expansion of employment 
opportunities;
and d) promoting an equitable d istribution of income 
and wealth in the country.
These aims are self-explanatory. The government recognizedO) that to achieve 
a ll the four aims, the levels of wages, prices and profits should be within 
certain desirable lim its. This is  indeed true because uncontrolled increases 
in earnings of different income-groups could be in conflict with these goals 
set by government. Some income earners could increase the ir earnings more 
rapidly than others, and though th is could be consistent with rapid economic 
growth, it  w ill be in conflict with the aim of equitably d istributing income 
and wealth.
To set the lim its beyond which a ll types of incomes cannot reach, the government
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instituted the Incomes Policy. It s  aims were as follows:
to maximize the growth of new job opportunities;
to prevent a widening of the gap in liv in g  
standards between those in formal sector jobs 
and those dependent on traditional agriculture;
to prevent government's scarce financial resources 
from being d irectly or indirectly pre-empted by 
the modern sector.(2)
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Some salient facts were presented in the Incomes Policy document which provided 
a backing to the government's fears and hence establish necessity for the 
Incomes Policy. F irs t,  i t  was pointed out that labour was highly mobile in 
Botswana due to seasonal factors and patterns of rain. The government warned 
that more people would come to the urban areas i f  wages were allowed to rise  
rapidly. Secondly, it  was pointed out that there was a high wage differential 
between urban and rural areas. People in urban areas earned on average 
between RIO and R20 as against average earnings between R5 and RIO in rural 
areas.(3) Attention was also drawn to the high wage d ifferentia ls between 
unskilled and highly qualified technicians - a ratio of 20:1 between the 
technicians and the unskilled, and a ratio of 4:1 between the artisans and 
the unskilled workers re spective ly.W
With the in stitu tion  of the Incomes Policy, the government hoped to lower the 
rate of increases in formal sector wages hence reduce the attractiveness of 
formal sector employment. This would lower the level of migration from the 
rural areas to urban areas. Apart from curbing migration, the standards of 
liv ing  in rural areas w ill be more comparable to those in urban areas as the 
differential in earnings w ill have been narrowed.
Moreover, as most government employees are in urban areas, the levelling-off 
in wage increases would have an effect on the total wage b il l  of the c iv il 
servants. The total wage b i l l ,  as an expenditure, w ill decrease relative to 
other government expenditures, specifica lly  those in rural areas. More 
spending in rural areas w ill create more employment. Low wages create spin-off 
effects in the form of more jobs created by more attractive investments.
Why the Incomes Policy is  not a suitable tool to attain the stipu lated 
government goals.'
The Incomes Policy has been operative since it s  institution  in 1972. It  was 
part and parcel of the 1973-78 National Development Plan, and i t  is an integral 
part of 1976-81 National Development Plan. In fact, the 1976-81 Plan states 
that, in conformity with the Incomes Policy, " i t  is  not expected that during 
the Plan period the real incomes of public employees w ill be increased above 
the ir 1976/77 leve l." (5) Since public employee wages set the maximum level 
of a ll economy wages, we cannot expect real incomes of a ll workers in the 
country to rise  above the ir 1976/77 level during the period to 1981.
We believe that the Incomes Policy cannot bridge the gap between the skilled 
and the unskilled workers. The reason is  that i t  lim its the rates of increase
in wages equally between the wages of the sk illed  or unskilled. The sk illed  
workers have high wages already, so they w ill not suffer as much as the 
unskilled workers. Th'e gap between them stays constant, and it  w ill not be 
narrowed by this policy. Tripartite Wage Councils which were provided by the 
Incomes Policy to safeguard the interests of the very low paid, unskilled 
workers were set up in only five industries. These wage councils were to set 
minimum wages to be paid. Setting minimum wages does not on it s  own ensure 
that the absolute annual increases in wages, for the unskilled and sk illed  
workers, are such as to bridge the gap between their incomes.
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We also believe that the Incomes Policy cannot bridge the gap between urban 
and rural incomes because the urban-rural dichotomy can mainly be seen as one 
between the unskilled on one hand and the sk illed  on the other. The unskilled
workers are mainly the new a rriva ls in towns or they could be the seasonal 
workers with their characteristic high mobility. Hence, they have ties in 
rural areas. With the extended family system in the country, one can expect 
them to remit and/or take back home (to the rural areas) most of their earned 
income from towns. The sk illed  workers are mainly the expatriates and the 
old Batswana a rriva ls in towns. These workers can be expected to remit very 
lit t le  money to the rural areas of Botswana. Their interests l ie  in towns 
and/or in foreign countries. We cannot, then, separate the unskilled workers 
from the rural dwellers, but can separate the sk illed  workers from both the 
unskilled workers and the rural area dwellers.
It  follows then, that the continuation of the Incomes Policy to the end of 
1981 is  undesirable from the point of view of the unskilled workers who 
happen to be the Batswana. Fixing these workers' real wages at 1976/77 levels 
for the next four or five  years robs them of the benefits of their efforts.
We can only expect to see an increasing share of real national income going to 
the sk illed  category of workers. Besides, we could expect labour mobility to 
increase from season to season as workers attempt to supplement their real 
incomes by going back to grow crops during the rain season. In addition, an 
increasing number of workers could show a preference for work in South Africa 
rather than in Botswana, because the South African real wages could be 
increasing relative to those in Botswana.
To c la rify  these reasons behind our rejection of the Incomes Policy, we 
discuss it s  main aims one by one.
A. To maximize the growth of new job opportunities
Although cheap labour is  an inducement to investors, i t  is  only one of many 
inducements. It s  importance increases as it s  percentage share of total costs 
increases. In the extreme case, i f  wage-costs are 100% of costs, investors 
would only look to the general level of wages to decide setting up production. 
In Botswana, less than 30% of a ll resources are claimed by workers. The 
other seventy percent of resources go to capital including profits, government, 
and to raw materials.(°) A rational investor would watch the rates of 
increases in capital costs, taxes and raw material costs before worrying about 
rate of increase in wages. A government worrying about rates of increase in 
wages only without looking at the bulk of other costs could find it  d if f ic u lt  
to attract investors.
Moreover, the fact that there are many unemployed people in less-developed 
countries does not imply that the level of wages is  too high. In less- 
developed countries, minimizing the rate of increase in wages is  not a 
necessary and su ffic ient condition for the maximization of the growth rate of 
new job opportunities. The Incomes Policy apparently implies that i f  the rate 
of increase in wages is  lowered, the growth rate of new jobs w ill increase.
142
The classical economists^) (those economists subscribing to the popular theory 
prevalent before 1936 when J.M. Keynes published his General Theory of Employ­
ment, Interest and Money) believed that massive unemployment is  common in 
situations of overproduction of goods and services. They also believed that 
overproduction is  caused by too high a level of the general price level. To 
remove both unemployment and the oversupply of goods, the c lassica l economist 
required a situation where both the prices of goods and services, and also 
money wages, are completely flexib le. In th is case both prices and money wages 
should fa ll thereby making commodities cheaper. Demand for commodities would 
rise  until aggregate demand is equated to aggregate supply. As money wages 
fa ll,  producers' demand for workers would increase as i t  w ill be cheaper to 
hire labour, hence employment opportunities would expand.
But, i f  prices decrease at the same rate as money wages, real wages would remain 
constant. The more sophisticated classica l economists thought that this could 
impede the expansion in job opportunities. So, the expanded c lassica l argument 
requires money wages to fa ll faster than commodity prices. This w ill ensure 
a fa ll in wage costs, hence an expansion in job opportunities.
The fa ll in money and real wages could be necessary for the expansion of labour 
employment, but it ,  ipso facto, decreases effective demand of goods and services 
by the same wage earners. Once effective demand of commodities starts fa llin g , 
producers, who are also the employers, w ill cut down on production, hence 
unemployment. Downward f le x ib il it y  in wages cannot increase job opportunities.
The classical economists' mistake was to extend partial equilibrium analysis to 
the whole economy. It  is true that i f  there is unemployment in one industry, 
wages in that industry could be decreased. The resulting fa ll in effective 
demand by employees of th is single industry cannot affect aggregate demand for 
the output of th is industry which is  economy-wide. The industry w ill not, then, 
be forced to contract because of deficient demand. On the contrary, it  can 
expand effectively because wage costs w ill be lower and the market w ill not have 
been diminished sign ificantly.
This refutation of the "c la ss ica l" argument further strengthens the argument of 
derived demand in the whole economy. The concept of derived demand implies 
that producers can only demand the services of labour provided that what labour 
produces is bought. By advocating for low wages and salaries to attract foreign 
investors, the Incomes Policy ignores the concept of derived demand.
Wage earners are the consumers, and i f  they are subjected to constant real 
incomes for five years running, they cannot be expected to consume more in 
future than they consume now. It  is  like ly  that producers have analysed the 
market for most commodities here and concluded that i t  is  not worth setting up 
because demand is very limited. If  they have no "money illu s ion  , i.e. if  they
know the true purchasing power of money a ll the time, money increases in wages 
without real increases in income w ill not induce the producers to set up 
production in Botswana. Those producers who are already producing here w ill 
rather not expand their operations. Hence the consumers w ill continue 
importing the commodities and the job opportunities w ill not increase substan­
tia lly . In th is case, the Incomes Policy is  self-defeating.
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An argument is  brought up in the Incomes Policy document that real wages should 
not be allowed to rise  faster than labour productivity lest investment 
opportunities would be reduced and reduce employment. This is  theoretically 
true. However, for fa irn e ss1 sake, the workers must get their fa ir  share of 
productivity growth. The 1976/81 Plan forecasts that GDP w ill increase by an 
average of 9,6% per annum while formal employment w ill grow at about 6% per 
annum.(8) Clearly part of the difference (3,6% per annum) represents increase 
in productivity of the workers. This increased efficiency of workers is 
appropriated by other income earners, especially those receiving operating 
surplus.
The Incomes Policy document further says that the rise  in wages causes wage 
inflation, making manufactured goods more expensive but at the same time 
attracting rural dwellers to towns thereby increasing unemployment and poverty. 
The authors of the Incomes Policy, here, spec ifica lly  assume "money illu s io n " 
on the part of rural-urban migrants, i.e. although the increases in money wages 
could be squandered by the resulting increases in the prices of manufactured 
goods, the rural dwellers w ill s t i l l  flock to towns for starvation and 
unemployment; This is  b e litt ling  the whole problem facing the poor. The 
fact that some people choose poverty in towns rather than poverty in the rural 
areas might mean that poverty in the former is  subjectively less intense than 
in the latter. It  does not necessarily mean that such people are irrational.
It  further points out that there are not as many opportunities for these people 
both in the rural and urban areas, i.e. in Botswana as a whole. Forcing them 
to stay in areas with no opportunities (even where they do not hope for any 
opportunities) by providing no alternatives, is  not a solution to the dileirma.
It  only helps to disguise unemployment and hide the rural m ajority's suffering 
from the eyes of the urban-based ruling e lite.
The Incomes Policy document righ tly  mentions the lim itations of the Botswana 
market. This happens to be one of the reasons why most goods are produced
abroad. The extent of the market is  determined by both the level of population
and their purchasing power. In a country with a small population, like 
Botswana, one can only expand the market by increasing the purchasing power of 
the residents. To the extent that this is  not possible, the country can only 
look beyond it s  borders for a larger market i f  i t  happens to produce anything.
The international market is  highly competitive. The need to produce at low 
cost becomes a necessity. To achieve this the government w ill indiscriminately 
make efforts to depress a ll kinds of costs of production. The easier to 
control end up bearing the burden, even unfairly. This is  the position 
confronting wages today. But low wages can do very litt le .ta .p rice  levels i f  
they are only a re lative ly small percentage of total co sts. ' The Incomes 
Policy succumbs to the dictates of duality of development, where Botswana remains 
the in ferio r, periphery country. I t  cannot produce manufactured goods because 
it  has no large market, and whatever it  produces is  sold at give-away prices, 
in order to compete - a ll at the expense of the workers.
B To prevent a widening of the gap in liv in g  standards between those in 
formal sector jobs and those dependent on traditional agriculture:
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In developing countries, i t  is  the so-called unskilled workers whose income 
rise s rapidly in an attempt to bridge the gap existing between the ir lot and 
the foreign-trained experts. The Incomes Policy is ,  hence, aimed at the wages 
of these unskilled w orkers.! ' ')  Also, i t  has been made clear above that these 
unskilled workers, who happen to be the majority, are the ones with strong ties 
with the rural areas because they, usually, are the new arriva ls. According to 
the previous development p lanO2! ,  there exists strong family ties in Botswana 
so that wages of urban labour flow back to rural areas by way of remittances 
and other forms of support. Since the majority of rural households have very 
l i t t le  or no ca ttle ,( ' ’ ) a large percentage of rural incomes derive from urban 
incomes. I f  the urban incomes in question are low, the rural incomes derived 
from them w ill be even lower.
It  follows that i f  urban wages are kept constant, rural incomes w ill remain 
constant at lower levels than urban ones. Rural real incomes might even 
diminish because, with time, urban workers learn to live  at higher standards. 
They then would remit less and less to their rural based relatives. The gap 
in liv ing  standards w ill widen, as a result. Government policy w ill be se lf- 
defeating.
Secondly, the Incomes Policy does not effectively control other forms of incomes, 
like  rents and p rofits, as much as i t  controls wages. This is  so because i t  is  
practically simpler to control wages as they are set in contracts embracing 
thousands of workers at a time. Prices and rents are negotiated on a day-to-day 
basis involving m illions of transactions. This w ill make i t  impossible for 
government to track down a ll those who disregard price control regulations. In 
fact, most reta il outlets, especially in the car spares sector, a rb itra rily  f ix  
their own prices.
Workers' productivity is expected to increase during the years 1977 to 1981. 
Someone else w ill reap the benefits accruing from this increased efficiency of 
workers. These beneficiaries are mainly the p rofit earners and those who 
receive rent. Inequality between the wage-earners and the other income- 
earners w ill increase. There is a s ign ificant d isparity between the income of 
the garage owner, for example, who lives in Gaborone's Extension Nine (9), and 
his employee (a car lubricator, or some unskilled artisan helper) who lives in 
Old Naledi. There is l i t t le  d isparity in income between the car lubricator and 
h is cousin who lives in some v illage  outside town, for instance. No worker in 
Botswana can claim as much gains from modern development as is  claimed by such 
petty owners of the means of production. There is  increasing inequality 
between unskilled workers (and their rural dweller relatives) on the one hand, 
and the sk illed  experts on the other, and the Incomes Policy tends to widen 
this gap.
C. To prevent the government's scarce financial resources from being directly 
or ind irectly pre-empted by the modern sector.
The central and local governments together employ the largest number of people
in the c o u n t r y . T h e s e  governments can only be able to increase the number 
of people they employ and the range of services they offer i f  their revenues 
increase. The governments find it  hard to increase these revenues because 
their sources are limited. It  follows then, that an increase in cost of 
either the labour employed by the governments, or the services they offer (or 
both) w ill lead to a decrease of services offered or the number of people 
employed by government (or both).
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The assumption in the above reasoning is  that the cost of services and/or 
salaries of government employees rise  suddenly with revenue constant, i.e. the 
percentage increase in government expenditure outstrips the percentage increase 
in total government revenue. This assumption is  not like ly  to be true in a 
country with a progressive tax system. Studies undertaken in the United 
States!^6) show that i f  the rate of in flation  is  equivalent to the rate of 
money income growth (leaving real income constant), a progressive tax structure 
w ill cause income earners to receive about one-third less of their after-tax 
real incomes. The taxpayers lose more in situations where in flation  rates 
outstrip money income growth. The fa ll in taxpayers' real income, ipso facto, 
means a gain in real government revenue by at least a third of the real revenues 
the government received in the previous period. This is  true in countries 
vwhere taxed incomes are not indexed for in fla tion , i.e. income earners auto­
matically receive some percentage of their income-which compensates their loss 
due to in fla tion  each year. This does not happen in Botswana.
The Incomes P o licy 's  third aim, hence, is  based on a false  premise. The truth 
is that real government revenues are not like ly  to be pre-empted by ris in g  c iv il 
servants' sa laries as long as the percentage increase in salaries is  below the 
inflation rate. Rates of in flation  are so high that they would outstrip even 
reasonable annual increases in money wages so, we expect the governments to get 
more and more revenues from income earners through in fla tion, just as we expect 
them to get more through the widening of the tax base as more and more people 
become employed. The progressive nature of the income tax structure pushes 
more and more people into higher tax brackets, and this directly boosts govern­
ment revenues. The statement, that it  is  expected that c iv il servants w ill get 
a 1981 real income whose level is  not above the 1976/77 level, conceals a lot 
of truth. This is  so because it  does not take into account the effects of 
progressive income taxation and in flation  on wage-earners' real income. All 
taxpayers w ill be getting lower real incomes in 1981 than they received in 1976. 
Taxation w ill have pre-empted the c iv il servants' sa la ries, and not vice-versa!
SUMMARY
The Incomes Policy should not have remained operative for more than one planning 
period. We hold this view because we believe that the le ss-sk ille d  workers 
stand to lose the benefits of their increasing efficiency under the Incomes 
Policy. Already the 1976-81 Development Plan projects a non-increasing real 
level of workers' incomes in the urban areas.
We do not believe that the Incomes Policy w ill maximize the growth rate in job 
opportunities during the 1976/81 Development Plan or indeed during any period. 
This is  so because the Incomes Policy contradicts some basic entrepreneurial 
attitudes, i.e. one can only produce more provided one is  assured of a market
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for one's product. I f  the market is  constant or even shrinking, a producer 
cannot produce more, hence he cannot employ more labour. The market is  made 
up of the workers themselves. The workers' real income is  not projected to 
increase from 1976 to 1981. It  might, in fact, fa ll.  Hence producers w ill 
not set up manufacturing units in the country because the market is very small. 
Without any firms setting up there w ill be nobody employing the people here, 
hence job opportunities w ill not increase at the desired rate.
Secondly, we do not envisage the gap in liv ing  standards between the unskilled 
urban worker and the rural dweller widening. These two are attached to each 
other through the extended family system and they share the l i t t le  the other 
gets from urban employment. Instead, we envisage a widening gap in the liv ing  
standards between the sk illed  and property owners, on the one hand, and the 
unskilled workers and the rural dwellers, on the other. This is  what we view 
as "increasing inequality". The reason for this happening is  that the Incomes 
Policy can keep wages only, constant (i.e. wages of the already poorly paid 
people) not rents, interest, profits and prices. The salaries of the sk illed  
workers and proprietors are already high.
Thirdly, we attempted to demonstrate the fallacy of Government revenues being 
pre-empted by increases in c iv il servants' sa laries. Inflation and progressive 
income taxation work, unflinchingly, to see that government revenues are not 
pre-empted, but the Incomes Policy has actually ensured that the consumer's 
purchasing power w ill continue to be pre-empted by taxation. The earners of 
this income, which is  continually being eroded, are also the breadwinners for 
the majority in the rural areas. Faced by an impossible situation where they 
might fa il to feed themselves, we can only expect them to stop supporting their 
rural-based relative, thereby destroying one of the important customs - the 
extended family system.
On the whole, we contend that urban labour in Botswana is  made to bear the cost 
of increasing the competitiveness and p ro fitab ility  of the businesses unneces­
sa rily . This is  so because, although the Incomes Policy was designed to 
control the increase in wages, sa la ries, p rofits, prices and rents, it  is 
d if f ic u lt  to control prices, rents, hence profits in market economies. Prices 
and rents are negotiated on a day to day basis covering a lim itless number of 
commodities and transactions^.g. spare parts for cars, rooms or houses for 
rent etc) not only among residents but also with foreigners. Wages could be 
settled in a few contracts covering thousands of workers at one time, hence 
they are easier for governments to control.
FOOTNOTES
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1. This paper is  based on the National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices 
and Profits, Government Paper No. 2 of 1972. The document explains why 
it  was necessary to institute  an incomes policy.
2. Ib id .
3. All figures are quoted from the Incomes Policy document, 0£. c i t .
4. Ib id .
5. Government of the Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan 1976-81, 
M inistry of Finance and Development Planning, (Government Printer, Gaborone) 
p.18, para. 2.30.
6. National Development Plan 1976-81, op. c i t . p.42, Figure 2.13,
7. For a more detailed Keynesian critique of C lassical Economics, see A.
Stonier and D. Hague, A Textbook of Economic Theory, 3rd ed. (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1964) pp 353-60.
8. National Development Plan 1976-81, op. c i t . p.23, para 2.68.
9. Ib id , p.30, Fig. 2.4. Operating surplus increases at the expense of 
income accruing to Botswana for the period 1976/77 to period 1980/81.
10. See (6) above.
11. Professor Ghai, the consultant on the Incomes Policy, clearly made this
point in the document: National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices
and P ro f it s , op . c i t . p.4, para.13.
12. Government of the Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan 1973-78, 
M inistry of Finance and Development Planning, (Government Printer, Gaborone) 
p.41, para. 3.32.
13. See National Development Plan 1976-81 op. c it. page 72, para 4.30. About 
45% of the rural population have no cattle at a ll and a further 20% have 
fewer than 10 cattle.
14. See (8) above.
15. This is  stated in the Incomes Policy document, 0£. c i t . p.4. para.15.
16. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, vol.50, No.5, May 1977, in "So 
what, it s  only a Five Per cent In fla tion ", by Leonall C. Andersen, pp.21-23.
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